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ABSTRACT 
The sustained rise in German unemployment since 1973 poses a 
problem of critical importance for the world economy. Fewer than 
two decades ago, Germany boasted an average unemployment rate of 
under 1% and imported labor to relieve chronic labor shortages. By 
the mid-1980s, unemployment had risen to over 8 percent of the 
labor force. This paper investigates some of the reasons for the 
secular rise in unemployment. We find that while deficient 
aggregate demand can probably explain some of the current 
joblessness, the secular rise in unemployment has consisted 
primarily of an increase in the equilibrium rate of unemployment. 
We also find little evidence that this increase is due to changes 
in frictional unemployment. Rather, after reviewing institutional 
details of the labor market in Germany, we identify various 
impediments to the kinds of structural adjustments that have 
operated to maintain a fairly constant equilibrium rate of 
unemployment in the United States. 
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The sustained rise in German unemployment since 1973 poses a 
problem of critical importance for the world economy. Fewer than 
two decades ago, this country boasted an average unemployment rate 
of under 1% and imported labor to relieve chronic labor shortages. 
By the mid-l980s, unemployment had risen to between 8 and 9 
percent of the labor force- -levels not observed since the early 
years of the Marshall Plan. These developments are even more 
striking when compared with the United States, where average 
unemployment rates have been higher but have also recovered from 
the last two recessions (see Table 1). Furthermore, much of the 
secular increase in West German unemployment took place during 
periods of relatively high economic growth. 
This paper investigates some of the reasons for the secular 
rise in West German unemployment. We find that while deficient 
aggregate demand can certainly explain some of the current 
joblessness in the country, the secular rise in unemployment has 
consisted primarily of an increase in the equilibrium rate of 
unemployment. We find little evidence that this increase is due to 
changes in so-called "frictional" unemployment, such as increased 
job search due to lower costs of search or an increase in the 
variance of economic shocks impinging on the economy. Rather, we 
find more convincing evidence of institutional forces impeding 
labor market adjustments, most importantly, the inability of labor 
markets to adjust and reallocate labor through wage changes. For 
example, it is widely recognized that large adverse shocks to 
1 
Table 1 
Inflation and Unemployment in West Germany 
and the US, 1960-1986 
FRG US 
1f U 1f U 
60-64 2,4 0.6 1.2 5,5 
65-69 2,4 0.8 3.4 3.7 
1970 3.3 0.8 5.9 4.8 
1971 5.4 0,9 4.3 5.8 
1972 5.5 0.8 3,3 5.5 
1973 6.9 0.8 6.3 4.8 
1974 7.0 1.6 10.0 5.5 
1975 5.9 3.6 9.2 8.2 
1976 4.3 3.7 5.8 7.6 
1977 3.6 3.6 6.5 6.9 
1978 2.8 3.5 7.5 6.0 
1979 4.0 3.2 11.3 5.8 
1980 5.5 3.0 l3.5 7.0 
1981 6.3 4.4 10.2 7.5 
1982 5.3 6.1 6.0 9.5 
1983 3.3 8.0 3.1 9.5 
1984 2.4 8.5 3.4 7.4 
1985 2.2 8.6 3.5 7.1 
1986 -0.2 8.3 1.5 6.9 
Source: DECO Main Economic Indicators. 
manufacturing labor demand in the 1970s occurred in most of the 
industrial economies. In the United States, these shocks were 
mediated in part by falling manufacturing sector wages (especially 
in nonunion firms) and by an expansion of employment in the 
lower-wage service (or tertiary) sectors. After reviewing the 
institutional detail of labor markets in the Federal Republic of 
Germany, we find strong evidence of impediments to the kinds of 
structural adjustments that have taken place in the US over the 
past fifteen years. 
We begin our analysis in Section 3 by considering the 
response of a two sector economy that sustains an adverse shock to 
its manufacturing sector, in the presence of a lower-wage service 
sector. Following the literature, we presume that wages in the 
manufacturing sector are set by unions, introducing some degree of 
real wage ridigity. We assume alternatively that the low wage 
service, sector is characterized by market clearing, or by rigid 
wages as in manufacturing. The rigid wages in the service sector 
may be due to the presence of unions, to legal restrictions on 
wage reductions, or to an effective floor on wages determinined by 
the level of unemployment benefits. 
We then present evidence that the US is more like the 
economy characterized by labor market clearing in services, 
whereas the Federal Republic of Germany resembles more nearly the 
case of rigid wages. This is most obviously reflected in the 
absolute and relative growth of the service-producing sectors in 
the two countries. An increase in the extent of wage dispersion 
across the sectors, which is predicted for the first economy, only 
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obtains in the US. Additionally, labor productivity in the service 
sectors has grown at considerably lower rates in the US, as would 
be expected with rigid wages in services in Germany and flexible 
wages in services in the US. The differential productivity 
performance is mirrored (as predicted by the model) by the 
differing paths of capital-labor ratios in the service sectors of 
the two economies. 
While we cannot make an exact apportionment of the reasons 
for non market-clearing in West German service sectors, we suspect 
that two primary factors block a US-style expansion of the 
tertiary industries in West Germany. First, the remarkable growth 
of unionism in the service branches in Germany has resulted in 
significantly better wage outcomes than in the corresponding US 
sectors. Furthermore, institutions peculiar to West Germany 
increase the impact of collective bargaining agreements on costs: 
union agreements are implicitly or explicitly extended to cover 
nonunion workers, and increasingly in those sectors that would be 
expected to absorb redundant labor released by the production 
sectors. Second, there is evidence that the unemployment insurance 
system may preclude wage reduction in the West German service 
sector, since compensation in these sectors would often be 
dominated by unemployment benefits as has been argued by Minford 
(1985). 
1. The Rise in the NAIRU in the Federal Republic of Germany 
The recent experience in Western Europe and West Germany in 
particular pose a serious challenge to the conventional "natural 
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rate of unemployment" (or "non-accelerating inflation rate of 
unemployment," the NAIRU) paradigm first proposed by Milton 
Friedman (1968), which is widely considered an important point of 
agreement among macroeconomists. Since the natural rate of 
unemployment is normally regarded as relatively stable and 
determined by factors that evolve only slowly over time, advocates 
of the typical natural rate view must view the rise in European 
unemployment as the outcome of "depression" conditions induced 
by sharp declines in aggregate demand, in conjunction with the 
presence of nominal rigidities or expectationa1 error. Several 
arguments, however, suggest that this view is incorrect; rather, 
the secular rise in unemployment rates in the Federal Republic of 
Germany has largely represented movements in the natural rate 
itself. 
This conclusion is generally supported by analysts who have 
attempted to estimate the West German NAIRU directly. Layard 
et. a1. (1984) report an increase of the natural rate in Germany 
from 1. 3% in the late 1960s to 6.2% over 1981-1983; Coe and 
Gagliardi (1985) find an increase from 0.9 to 8.0%; Franz (1985) 
estimates a NAIRU as high as 8.9% if obsolescence effects of the 
capital stock are included. In contrast, estimates of the 
equilibrium unemployment rate in the US has remained fairly stable 
over the past decade, increasing by no more than 2% between the 
late 1960s and the early 1980s (Coe and Gagliardi 1985). 
Using two different techniques, we estimated the path of the 
NAIRU in the US and West Germany over the past twenty-five years. 
The first simply uses estimates of the barebones "acce1erationist 
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equation," which relates the rate of acceleration of the price 
level to the deviation of current unemployment from the NAIRU, 
with the latter proxied by a constant plus a fourth order 
polynomial in time. Specifically, we use OLS to estimate 
(1) 
where 0t - Q t + Q t 2 + Q t 3 + Q t", 
1 2 3 " 
U
t 
is the OECD standardized 
c 
unemployment rate, t is time, and ~t is the rate of change in the 
consumer price indices. If inflationary expectations are formed 
via a weighted average of past inflation rates with weights 
summing to unity, this equation may be derived from an 
expectations-augmented Phillips curve relation. An estimate of the 
NAIRU can be obtained each period by setting K~- c c ~ .., K t-l t-2 and 
calculating 
where hats denote estimates. 
As a more conservative alternative, we used a frequency 
domain procedure that assumes that deviations of actual from 
equilibrium unemployment only occur in the context of the business 
cycle. Movements of unemployment at low frequencies represent 
equilibrium movements, and at high frequencies, movements in the 
cyclical unemployment rate. We first difference the standardized 
unemployment rate series, decompose the data into its frequency 
components via Fourier transform, and then mask all components at 
periodicities of eight years or lower. An inverse Fourier 
transform was then applied to the data, which are then summed 
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Iab1e .2. 
OECD Standardized Unemployment Rates 
and estimates of NAIRU, US and FRGt 
65-69 70-74 75-79 80-85 81 82 83 84 85 
FR Germany 
NAIRU1 0,8 1.8 3.0 6.1 4.8 5.5 6.4 7.4 8.6 
NAIRU2 1.3 1.6 2.7 4.5 3.6 4.2 4.8 5.3 5.7 
SU 0.8 1.0 3.5 6.4 4.4 6.1 8.0 8.5 8.6 
United States 
NAIRU1 4.5 5.6 6.9 7.4 7.4 7.5 7.4 7.4 7.2 
NAIRU2 4.5 5,4 6.0 6.6 6,6 6,7 6,8 6,7 6,6 
SU 3.7 5.3 6.9 8.0 7.5 9.5 9.5 7.4 7.1 
tSU is the OECD standardized unemployment rate; NAIRU1 is 
estimated using estimates of (1); NAIRU2 is the cumulative sum of 
the low frequency components in first differenced SUo See the text 
for details. 
from some base year, here 1960. The resu1 ts of both procedures 
using OECD standardized unemployment rates are displayed in Table 
2.1 
The results obtained by the two procedures are similar, and 
support the results of other studies cited above. Whereas 
unemployment in the United States has returned frequently to the 
neighborhood of 6-7%, there is strong evidence that the 
equilibrium rate in the Federal Republic of Germany continues 
to rise. Our NAIRU estimates for Germany, which range from 5.7 to 
8.6%. in 1985, also suggest the existence of some "Keynesian" 
unemployment that might be vitiated by a demand expansion (in that 
the actual unemployment rate exceeds the NAIRU); nonetheless, in 
both cases this represents a deviation around ~ secularly rising 
equilibrium rate. Unless the paradigm of an "equilibrium rate" 
is completely abandoned, deficient aggregate demand explanations 
of European unemployment proposed by Tobin (1984) are only 
capable of explaining a fraction of the fifteen year secular 
rise in West German unemployment. 
Our assessment of the NAIRU is consistent with evidence on 
capacity utilization rates, total capacity, and the evolution of 
1These procedures are of course not without important econometric 
and conceptual problems. Sargent (1971) has correctly criticized 
constraining the sum of weights on lagged inflation rates to unity 
as a potentially suboptimal forecast. The first procedure ignores 
simultaneous equations bias that arises if the inflation rate and 
the unemployment rate are jointly determined. It is also 
inconsistent with strong forms of rational expectations; clearly, 
if policies inducing a constantly increasing inflation rate over 
time were fully anticipated by agents, the economy would not 
systematically deviate from the NAIRU. The second procedure may 
underestimate the NAIRU if some of its movements occur over the 
business cycle itself, 1. e., if "hysteresis" considerations are 
operative. 
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the capital stock. As Modig1iani (1986) ~.gl. have noted, the EC 
countries in general have sustained a severe reduction of 
productive capacity, and Burda (1987) has documented a large 
cumulative reduction in the size of manufacturing capital stocks 
relative to trend in these countries. As is evident from Table 3, 
the aggregate capacity utilization rate in West German 
manufacturing in 1986 is equal to its 1979 value, whereas US plant 
utilization remains significantly below its previous peak. This 
suggests that despite high unemployment rates in Germany, firms 
are operating at full capacity. Moreover, if we estimate equation 
(1) and using a capacity utilization rate rather than the 
unemployment rate, we find a stable relationship (insignificance 
of time shift variables) between German inflation and German 
capacity utilization, instead of the unstable relationship bwtween 
inflation and unemployment. The results presented in Table 4 imply 
that unemployment rates in Germany, in contrast to capacity 
utilization rates, contain relatively little information about the 
overall state of unused resources in the economy. They also 
suggest that firms have adjusted their long-run capacity to levels 
consistent with a high equilibrium level of unemployment. 
2. The Role of Frictional Unemployment 
One explanation for the marked rise in equilibrium 
unemployment in the Federal Republic of Germany is predicated on 
the view that most unemployment is frictional; the rise in 
unemployment is posited to involve prolonged job search or greater 
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Table 1 
Capacity Utilization Rates ill 
1975-79 1979 1985 1986 
FR Germany 
DECO 80.5 84.7 84.3 84.7 
Kie1 97.0 99.8 97.5 99.1 
US (DECO) 81.0 86.0 80.3 79.8 
DECO: Main Economic Indicators; Kie1- Institut fur We1twirtschaft, 
Kie1. 
Table g, 
Phillips Curve Estimates a 
(1960-85) 
FR Germany 
constant 0.030 -0.214 0.116 
(3.4) (-5.0) (3.9) 
c 0.807 1.301 1.153 ""t-1 
c 0.193 -0.301 -0.153 "" t-~ 
(1. 2) (-2.3) (-1.0) 




t -0.010 -0.001 -0.017 
(2.5) (-0.3) (-1.8) 
t 2 0.001 6.824D-05 0.002 
(2.4) (0.1) (1.4) 
t 3 -7.693D-05 7.580D-06 -6.930D-05 
(-2.3) (0.2) 
t 4 1.517D-06 -3.114D-07 
(2.4) (-0.5) 
R 2 0.614 0.595 
S.E. 0.007 0.007 
D-W 2.32 2.72 
SU - OECD Standardized Unemployment Rate 
CAP - OECD Capacity Utilization Rate 
aEquation (1) is estimated in the form 


























job mismatch. In this section we attempt to examine the 
plausibility of theories of frictional unemployment in 
accounting for the path of official unemployment, vacancies and 
employment growth in West Germany, relying on comparisons of West 
German and US labor market experiences. 
The preponderance of evidence on the provision of 
unemployment benefits (Layard, et.~, 1984, 
Burt1ess 1986) 
replacement ratios 
indicates little significant increase in 
over the past two decades. Thus the simple 
hypothesis that a reduction in search costs is responsible for 
increased joblessness seems unlikely. A more plausible model of 
frictional unemployment first proposed by Lucas and Prescott 
(1974) emphasizes the role of sectoral shifts in the determination 
of the NAIRU for given preferences of agents, 
recently investigated by Lilien (1982) using 







buffeted by idiosyncratic disturbances. Since agents require 
time to move, retrain, and learn about new opportunities, the 
natural rate is a function of the variance of sectoral shocks, 
and thus sectoral hiring rates. Not only is the "churning" view 
of unemployment theoretically appealing, but seems at first 
glance a plausible characterization of the facts. Employment in 
Germany's industrial sectors (construction, energy, and 
manufacturing) has declined significantly since the first OPEC 
shock. Moreover, these shocks have fallen asymmetrically on the 
country, affecting the coastal and Ruhr regions more adversely 
than Bavaria and Baden-Wurttemberg. 
8 
The wealth of macroeconomic evidence, however, provides 
little support for job mismatch explanations of the rise in the 
Yest German NAIRU. At the most cursory level, the shift in the 
so-called "Beveridge curve" that several analysts have identified 
2 in the US is not evident in Germany. To recall, the Beveridge 
curve is the hypothesized inverse relationship between 
vacancies and unemployment for a given set of structural, 
taste, and institutional parameters. This association might 
be due to shifts in aggregate demand with nominal rigidities 
or to labor cost conditions impinging on the demand for labor, 
shifts of which presumably would move the number of unemployed 
individuals and available jobs in opposite directions. On the 
other hand, shifts in tastes for leisure versus consumption, 
institutionally or technologically determined search and 
opportunity costs, unemployment insurance, as well as the 
sectoral composition of the economy, will shift the entire 
Beveridge curve inward or outward. Figure 1 graphs vacancy and 
unemployment rates in Yest Germany and the US over the period 
1960-1984. The U-V locus in the Federal Republic appears far more 
stable than its US counterpart! While the Beveridge curve itself 
has only modest theoretical foundations (see Jackman, 
Layard, and Pissarides 1984), movements in the curve in Germany 
provide no support for the hypothesis that at given unemployment 
rates the number of jobs unfilled has risen substantially. 
If, as suggested by Li1ien (1982), the source of increased 
2 
See Medoff and Abraham (1982) and Summers (1986) for evidence on 
the US; for corroborating evidence on Germany, see Bell (1986). 
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frictional unemployment is an increase in variability of sectoral 
economic activity, it may be poorly detected in aggregate data 
(and Figure 1). A necessary condition for the "increased 
churning" hypothesis to hold, however, is an increase in the 
sectoral variability of hiring rates. For each year in the 
period 1961-1984, we computed the standard deviation of 
sectoral employment growth rates for the following group of seven 
private one-digit industry groups: energy/gas/mining, 
manufacturing, construction, wholesale and retail trade, transport 
and communication, finance, and other private services. 3 The 
results are plotted in Figure 2. While rising volatility of 
sectoral employment in the US seems to support Li1ien's 
hypothesis, this volatility has been declining in West 
Germany, suggesting if anything a lack of sufficiently 
offsetting growth in expanding sectors. We shall return to this 
important point below. 
This conclusion is supported by evidence on regional and 
occupational mismatch. If the Li1ien hypothesis were true, the 
recent decade should have been characterized by an increase in 
the imbalance across regions and occupations as agents wait, 
retrain, or search. Applying a measure suggested by Jackman, 
Layard and Pissarides (1984) to unemployment and vacancy data 
from the Federal Employment Office (Bundesanstalt fur Arbeit), we 
examined the change over time in "mismatch." The relevant 
statistic is 
3 As Li1ien (1982) notes, employment growth rates are 
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where u
i 
and vi are the share of total unemployment and vacancies 
of the ith state, occupation, or industry. The mismatch measure 
may be interpreted as the percentage of workers who must 
move, change occupations, or change industry to equalize the ratio 
of unemployment to vacancies in groupings. Time profiles of 
occupational (39 categories), regional (10 LAnder), and industrial 
(10 sectors) mismatch are displayed in Table 5. Our results on 
occupational mismatch are similar to those of Layard, et.al. 
(1984) for the UK; we find a significant decline (roughly 50%) in 
occupational mismatch over the period 1979-1984. We do find a 
significant increase in regional mismatch over the past decade. 
This supports generally anecdotal evidence on regional immobility 
attributed to unemployment insurance, restrictive mortgage 
contracts, and strong aversion to changing residence. For a 
country not much larger than the state of Oregon, this may be 
surprising; nonetheless, even if 20% of all unemployed Germans did 
move to high-vacancy LAnder, they would still face an official 
vacancy-unemployment ratio of nearly 1:25! 
Clearly, these numbers should be considered with some 
caution. First, unemployment data from West Germany are reported 
unemployment only and neglect unemployed individuals not 
registered at the local employment offices. Second, vacancy data 
cannot capture all offers made, and many offers are made directly 
to job seekers without assistance of the state-provided matching 













































Source: Arbeitsstatistik fur 1984, Bundesansta1t fur Arbeit 
(Federal Labor Office). Index is .5Llu.-vil, where u. and v. are 
h . h' .. d ~ h~ i ~ 1 t e ~t reg~on, occupat~on or ~n ustry percentage s are n tota 
unemployment and official vacancies, respectively. 
actual offers is stable, we can learn something about the 
preferences of and opportunities available to job searchers. 
If one dismisses changes in worker preferences as the 
primary cause of the rise in the natural rate of unemployment in 
West Germany, the culprit must be an insufficient number of jobs 
to employ the labor force normally willing to work at the current 
constellation of factor prices. This suggests a malfunctioning of 
the labor market, i.e., wages are not adjusting sufficiently to 
equilibrate demand and supply of labor and are above their market 
clearing levels for some or all sectors in the Federal 
Republic of Germany. 
3. ~ Non-Adjustment of Wages: Theory 
It is widely recognized that the 1970s were characterized by 
a series of adverse shocks to the demand for labor in all 
advanced industrialized countries: two oil price increases and 
a still largely unexplained productivity slowdown. In Europe, this 
was compounded by a well-documented increase in labor taxes. The 
"wage-gap" literature has uncovered important linkages between 
the post-shock performance of the Western industrial economies 
and the response of their labor market institutions (and real 
wages) to these developments. Moreover, the literature has 
rediscovered the real wage-employment relationship in European 
economies and a central role for aggregate supply in the 
12 
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evolution of European output and employment in the 1970s. 
What is the response of an economy to a decline in its terms 
of trade, an adverse shift in total factor productivity, or some 
other adverse shift to the demand for labor in its manufacturing 
sector? Under such circumstances, the scope is limited for real 
wage increases in manufacturing without negative effects on 
employment, and the level of wages consistent with high employment 
may actually decline. If, however, the manufacturing sector is 
unionized, these wage reductions may not be forthcoming. It is 
well-recognized that under a wide range of conditions, models of 
monopoly union behavior imply a rigid real consumption wage, or at 
least a rigid markup over the best alternative available in the 
5 
uncovered sector or the level of unemployment benefits. The union 
may be willing to accept some unemployment among its members in 
return for perserving a high real wage. Labor will be released 
from the manufacturing sector. 
Barring wage reductions in the sector that sustain the shock, 
either through direct concessions or an increase in the fraction 
of nonunionized employees in manufacturing, there will be a 
contraction of manufacturing employment. Redundant labor will be 
absorbed by the nonunion or uncovered sector, where wages will 
4See Sachs (1983), Artus (1984), Bruno and Sachs (1985), Newell 
and Symons (1985), Adams, Fenton, and Larsen (1986). 
5The seminal articles are McDonald and Solow (1981) and Oswald 
(1982); see also Bruno and Sachs (1985), chapter 9 and Oswald's 
1985 survey article. In the benchmark case, if utility of the 
representative member has constant relative risk aversion and the 
elasticity of labor demand is constant, the optimal union wage is 
a fixed markup over the non union alternative wage or the 
unemployment benefit. 
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adjust downward to clear the labor market. In the US, the service 
sector, which is little unionized, is a likely place to absorb 
mucht of the surplus labor. It is significant that all net US 
employment growth has occurred in the service 
6 
trade unions are of negligible importance. 
sectors, where 
We depict this two sector adjustment in the panels of Figure 
3. Labor is homogenous and supplied inelastically by households in 
quantity L, the length of the segment AB, which can be employed in 
either sector. In the absence of market restrictions, a single 
wage would clear the labor market. Suppose, however, that a union 
sets wages in the manufacturing sector at W· m' consequently 
employment in manufacturing is AC. Excess labor is absorbed by the 
other sector, so employment in the tertiary sectors is BC, at wage 
W . The response of this economy to a leftward shift of LD is s m 
displayed in the second panel of Figure 3. Employment in services 
increases from BC to BD, manufacturing employment declines from AC 
to AD and the service sector wage declines from W to W'. In 
s s 
practice in the US, W itself is not fully rigid, especially due 
m 
to the presence of a non-union manufacturing sector, so that 
adjustment takes place thorugh a reduction in Wand W .7 
m s 
6Freeman and Medoff (1984) report unionization rates of 34% and 
48% in US manufacturing and transport/communications/public 
utilities, respectively, compared with 10% in trade, 4% in FIRE 
(finance, insurance, and real estate), and 7% in other services. 
7 If the service sector wage comprises an important component of 
the alternative wage available to union members, the decline in 
the service sector wage may lead to a reduction of union wage 
demands in manufacturing, even if there is no non-union 
manufacturing subsector. This would reduce, but not wholly 
eliminate, the reduction in manufacturing employment and the 
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The labor markets in the Federal Republic of Germany will in 
general adjust with less flexibility to labor demand shocks. 
First, wages in the manufacturing (unionized) sector will likely 
decline less to increased unemployment than in the US. Second, the 
sectors considered uncovered in the US may also be unionized, or 
may for institutional reasons be required to pay some minimum 
wage. Third, even if these sectors are not unionized, unemployment 
insurance or welfare assistance may set a floor on the extent to 
which wages in these sectors can fall. These impediments prevent 
sufficient adjustment of nonunion, nonmanufacturing wages to 
absorb displaced workers. 
Consider the panels of Figure 4, which depict the initial 
equilibrium of such an economy and its response to an adverse 
labor demand shift in manufacturing. In contrast to the 
wage-adjusting economy, the economy in Figure 4 does not possess 
an absorbing service sector. Instead, real wages are prevented 
from adjusting, and there is an emergence of unemployment, given 
by the segment CD in the first panel. In this economy, the 
unemployment rate, rather than the relative wage differential, 
responds to disturbances. When LD shifts 
m 
leftward to 
unemployment increases from CD to ED. By assumption, relative 
wages across the two sectors remain the same. 
Even if there is no union in the other sector, the provision 
of unemployment insurance (UI) can have a similar impact on the 
response of an economy to a shock to its higher wage manufacturing 
sector. A sufficiently high unemployment benefit for newly 
unemployed workers released from the manufacturing sector could 
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introduce a lower bound on wages in the nonunionized service 
sector. In one sense, this unemployment is voluntary, since 
unemployed individuals are indifferent between working in the 
service sector and collecting UI benefits; if there is some 
probability of ultimate recall, their expected utility may be 
higher in the latter state. On the other hand, actual positions 
are never offered and would never appear in official vacancy data. 
Our simple model contains several strong predictions. In an 
economy with labor market clearing in services and a rigid wage in 
manufacturing, one should expect service sector employment to rise 
both absolutely and relative to manufacturing. In an economy with 
restricted adjustment in services, service sector employment will 
increase only in relative terms. The size of the service sector in 
terms of value added will respond similarly. Second, wage rigidity 
in manufacturing will imply an increase in nominal wage dispersion 
in the economy with market clearing. This follows from the fact 
that the uncovered sector wage must fall to clear the labor 
market. In the second economy, unemployment rises, but relative 
wage dispersion by assumption is unchanged. Third, service sector 
labor productivity in the first economy should decline in tandem 
with the service sector wage, as should the capital-labor ratio. 
Capital intensity in services will be higher in the second 
economy. In the next section, we will show that both 
institutional and labor market evidence strongly suggest that the 
US is well-characterized by the market clearing version of the 
model, while the Federal Republic of Germany is closer to the 
rigid wage version. 
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4. Evidence for the Model 
4.1. Institutional Evidence 
An understanding of institutions is a sine gua non for 
meaningful analysis of the evolution of wages and employment in 
the Federal Republic of Germany, since the institutions are quite 
different from their counterparts in the us. To begin with, 
collective bargaining process in Germany is highly regularized and 
legally circumscribed. Wage negotiations take place on an 
industry rather than craft level through seventeen national labor 
unions of the umbrella organization, the Deutscher 
Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB) , which at yearend 1985 had roughly 
7, 720,000 members. Representing the employer's side is a 
collection of about 1000 "employer associations" organized as the 
BDA (Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen ArbeitgeberverbAnde). While 
agreements are ultimately concluded at the regional and 
sometimes at the plant level, the constituent national unions 
publicize a wage demand at the outset of the annual bargaining 
round that serves as a standard for subsequent negotiations. 
Perhaps the most significant (and most frequently ignored) 
feature of collective bargaining in West Germany that 
distinguishes it from the US is the possibility for wage 
agreements 
employees 
to be declared "generally binding" for all 
and all enterprises in a sector, regardless of union 





closed shop is expressly forbidden by law, either side of a 
wage contract can petition the state (Land) labor minister for 
an extension of the contract terms to all workers and 
enterprises, as long as more than 50% of all workers in the 
relevant sector are employed by firms that were a party to the 
original agreement. 
The extension of wage agreements is an important element of 
the West German collective bargaining landscape. While in a given 
year only 10% of all agreements are declared generally binding, 
they are often nationwide contracts, representing about 20% of 
all employees in recent 9 years. Schatz (1984) argues that even 
if agreements are not declared generally binding, the high 
membership rates of employers in employers' confederations 
(80-90% in manufacturing) enforces the wage agreement as the de 
facto minimum wage, since member employers ~ legally bound by 
J!D.Y negotiated wage contract. Insofar as this action serves to 
"level the playing field" on the labor cost side, there is 
generally little objection from management of existing firms. It 
is often suggested that declining industries request extension as 
a flanking manuever. 
It follows that union membership figures severely 
8The provision is found in Section 5 of the Tarifvertragsgesetz 
(Wage Contract Law) of 1969. For references see the OECD (1979) 
and Boedler and Keiser (1979); Schatz (1984) and Soltwedel (1984) 
have written on the economic effects of "extension." 
9 
See Schatz (1984), p. 25. Moreover, the number of contracts 
"extended" has risen rapidly, from 173 contracts in 1968, to 448 
in 1975, to 563 in 1986. 
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underestimate the power of West Germany's industrial unions. 
Although the percentage of union membership hovers between 30 and 
40% of dependent-status employment, more than 90% of all 
German workers are employed in sectors covered by collective 
10 wage agreements! In contrast, the choice of union representation 
in collective bargaining in the United States is resolved in 
establishment level elections. Since union shop generally 
applies, there are few free riders and organization levels closely 
approximate coverage by wage contracts. 
Significantly, collective bargaining and its "minimum wage" 
characteristics extend to occupations and sectors which are 
generally nonunion in the US. While blue collar membership in DGB 
affiliated unions has remained constant over the past 15 years, 
white collar union membership has risen by more than 35%.11 The 
fastest growing DGB affiliate, Gewerkschaft Handel, Bank, und 
Versicherung (HBV), represents dependent status employees in 
the trade and finance sectors. Although its membership of 
370,000 (yearend 1985) represented only about 10% percent of all 
dependent employees in those sectors, it bargains on behalf of the 
nationwide workforce in both banking and insurance, and has been 
able to conclude state-wide wage agreements in the wholesale and 
retail trade sectors. The DBG union Nahrung, Genu.B, GaststAtte 
(NGG), has extended its traditionally manufacturing orientation 
100ECD (1979), and "Tarifvertrag1iche Arbeitsbedingungen im Jahr 
1985," Bundesminister fur Arbeit und Sozia1ordnung, Release 
lllal-31205-2. (January 1986), p.2. 
11 
Source: EUROSTAT, Trade Union Membership; Methods and 
Measurement in the EC, 1985. 
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towards employment in the eating and lodging establishments, 
although these contain large numbers of family businesses and 
foreign workers. Moreover, because the tertiary sectors are 
characterized by greater numbers of smaller firms and lower 
membership rates in the employers' associations, the likelihood of 
an extension is higher; 23% of all "extended" wage agreements, for 
12 
example, are in wholesale and retail trade. The German Federal 
Labor Office reports extensions in such diverse 
occupations as beauticians, transport workers, 






An important implication of the strong industrial unionism 
observed in lJest Germany is that wage agreements tend not to 
reflect differences in regional labor market conditions. Table 6 
documents contractual wages for most highly skilled metal workers 
in four lJest German regions with markedly different labor market 
conditions. Schleswig-Holstein, Hamburg, Bremen, and Lower Saxony 
have suffered from a decline of shipbuilding and steel 
industries. In contrast, unemployment in Bavaria and 
Baden-lJurttemberg has been significantly lower than the 
national average, reflecting steady demand for machine 
tools, automobiles, and high-tech products. Despite widely 
disparate economic circumstances, IG Metall settlements have 
varied little across bargaining regions over the past decade. The 
12 
See Schatz (1984), p. 26. 
13See Bundesanstalt fur Arbeit, op.cit. ,p.3. It should be noted 
that not all provisions of a wage contract need be extended; 
nonetheless, wage prov1s1ons are the predominant object of 
extension when the entire contract is not extended. 
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Table .2. 
Metal Workers Contractual Wage Settlements and 
Unemployment Rates. Selected Years. 1975-1984 
1975 1980 1984 
U w* U w* U 
Baden-Wurttemberg 3.5 9.49 2.3 11.73 5.6 
Bavaria 5.2 8.83 3.5 12.44 7.8 
Lower Saxony/ 5.4 9.43 4.7 12.44 12.1 
Bremen 
Sch1eswig-Ho1stein/ 4.6 9.43 3.8 12.44 10.9 
Hamburg 
* w is the contractual hourly wage as per IG Meta11 
agreements (DM/hour). U is regional unemployment rate. 








disappearance of significant wage drift over the same period 
documented by Grundlach (1986) indicates that these wages 
probably represent binding minima. 
We have argued above that another institutional factor that 
potentially limits the extent to which wages in the tertiary 
sectors can fall is the provision of unemployment insurance (UI) 
and related benefits. By creating a floor on wages paid by 
service-producing industries, the UI system may function much like 
a union. In Germany this certainly seems feasible: assuming they 
qualify, unemployed workers receive 63% of their last wage for one 
year (Arbeitslosengeld), and about 52% for the next year 
(Arbeitslosenhilfe), followed by a similar rate thereafter 
(Sozialhilfe). For a comparative overview of the extent and 
duration of coverage for an average married breadwinner, see Table 
7, which we have taken from Burtless (1986). Not only is the West 
German statutory replacement ratio considerably higher (66 versus 
37% of last wage) but the period of coverage is considerably 
longer (one year with indefinite extension versus 26 weeks). 
Moreover, Minford (1985) suggests that in Germany actual 
replacement ratios--the fraction of net take-home pay received by 
unemployed individuals- - normally exceed the official statutory 
ratios. This is due to fixed components and nonlinearities in the 
benefit schedules, social welfare supplements, and the tax 
treatment of the benefit. 
We have cited a litany of striking institutional differences 
between the two economies that have the potential to block 





A Comparison of Unemployment Insurance 
Benefits in the FR Germany and the USt 
b Duration of Coverage Replacement Rate 
Ratio a Year 1 Year 2 Benefits
C 
.74 -.80 66% 56% 1 year to indefinite 
.41 -.50 37% none 26 weeks 
tFrom Table 9 in Burt1ess (1986). 
aAverage number of recipients of UI divided by total number of 
unemployed, 1979-1981. 
bNet replacement rate in first and second years of unemployment 
for average age worker who is married to dependent spouse and is 
without children. 
CPotential duration of unemployment insurance and follow-up 
unemployment assistence. 
industries. We now proceed to examine actual evidence from the 
respective labor markets. Specifically, we will focus on (1) the 
level of real wages in manufacturing and (2) the comparative 
response of the two economies in the tertiary sectors. 
4.2. Evidence from Labor Markets 
The Nonadjustment 2f ~ in Manufacturing; The Wage Gap 
Revisited 
The last decade witnessed a resurgence of interest in the 
role of supply-related factors on growth and employment, and a 
large literature now exists on the role of labor costs in 
aggregate supply and the demand 
14 
for employment. A central theme 
of these comparative studies is the failure of real wages in 
manufacturing to moderate sufficiently after a series of inward 
shifts in the demand for labor. These shifts include the two OPEC 
shocks, which may be likened to a one-time productivity regress, 
the secular decline in manufacturing terms of trade brought 
about by competition from newly industrializing economies, and 
the worldwide productivity slowdown. 
In the last five years, however, the "disequilibrium wage 
hypothesis" as applied to the European economies has been 
subjected to increasing criticism. That unemployment continued to 
rise in recent years despite apparent wage moderation has prompted 
many analysts to dismiss the relevance of wage levels for the 
current labor market imba1ance.
lS 
Often cited is the fact that the 
14 
See Sachs (1979,1983), Artus (1984), Bruno and Sachs (1985), 
and Newell and Symons (1985). 
IS 
See for example Tobin (1984), Bruno (1986), and Gordon (1986). 
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1985 labor share of manufacturing in West Germany --tautologically 
the ratio of aggregate product wages to average productivity-- has 
fallen to levels of the early 1970s (see Figure 5). It is 
important to note that any account of the rise in the NAIRU in 







requires a demonstration that real 
above levels consistent with high 
It is widely understood, however, that the wage share itself 
contains no information about the consistency of wages with full 
employment, since labor's current average product will generally 
17 differ from average product at full employment. Some form of 
adjustment is necessary for effects that additional employment 
will have on the marginal, and average, product of labor. This 
correction may have a neoclassical justification; an increase in 
employment will reduce marginal product, and thereby the 
correponding wage at high employment. An alternative correction, 
suggested among others by Gordon (1986), is motivated by labor 
hoarding or increasing returns to labor; it implies average 
productivity may increase with labor input. These adjustments have 
led to the "wage-gap" measure--defined as the percentage deviation 
of real product compensation levels from the (estimated) marginal 
product of labor at high employment. Despite problems involving 
16Th , . 1 d h . id 1 f d d ~s ~nc u es t e r~g rea wage cum terms 0 tra e an 
productivity slowdown (Sachs 1979 and Bruno-Sachs 1985) as well as 
membership induced hysteresis (Blanchard and Summers 1986) and 
the capital shortage (Giersch 1981, Modigliani et.a1.1986). 
17 
See Sachs (1983), Klodt (1986). 
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1960 1910 1980 1985 
estimation of full employment labor supply, the specification and 
estimation of an aggregate production function, and the 
possibility of firm disequilibrium behavior, the use of the wage 
gap concept by many analysts and the acceptance by the OECD and 
the IMF of its "diagnostic function" (Bruno 1985) indicates its 
utility in policy circles. 
In his original investigation, Sachs (1983) assumed a 
Cobb-Douglas technology with Harrod-neutral technical progress. 
While many have criticized the Cobb-Douglas assumption, which 
implies constant factor shares in equilibrium, this criticism 
seems largely unjustified. If the true technology is CES 
with substitution elasticity less than unity, a Cobb-Douglas 
assumption actually biases estimated wage gaps downward, or 
against the conclusion that wages are 
18 
excessive. The constancy 
of wage shares throughout the period of capital deepening in the 
1960s is well-documented and difficult to explain jointly with 
the runup of wage shares in the 1970s unless (1) the production 
technology is Cobb-Douglas with slow adjustment or (2) 
parameters of technology are themselves changing over time. While 
both Artus (1984) and McCallum (1985) have estimated low 
labor-capital substitution elasticities, these estimates may 
criticized for not adequately considering disequilibrium firm 
behavior, since departures from long run equilibrium may involve 
both Keynesian (labor hoarding) and neoclassical (costs of 
18 Recall that the the local elasticity of labor demand when 
production is CES with fixed capital stock is o/sK where 0 and 
sK are the capital-labor substitution elasticity and capital's 
value-added share; the wage gap is approximately w-w* -sK/o(n*-n), 
where the asterisks denote high or full employment values. 
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adjustment) aspects. In the Appendix, we employ an error 
correction model applied to nonstationary time series, (see for 
example Granger and Engle 1987) to estimate the capital-labor 
elasticity of substitution from the firm's first order condition 
for profit maximization. The error correction model has the virtue 
of imposing the estimated relationship only in the long run, while 
allowing for short run deviations which are left relatively 
unconstrained. We find strong evidence for the Cobb-Douglas 
specification in aggregate West German manufacturing. 
Given a Cobb-Douglas specification of technology, how does 
one estimate the marginal product of labor at "high" employment? 
Sachs (1983) assumed that employment in 1960, 1973 and 1979 
equalled full employment, and interpolated peak-to-peak growth in 
average productivity as its underlying trend at full employment, 
which under Cobb-Douglas technology equals marginal productivity 
up to a multiplicative constant. Since unemployment rates in 
Germany have failed to fall significantly over the past recovery, 
it would be incorrect to consider average productivity in the 
1980s as deviations around "high employment" levels, just as it is 
incorrect to consider the unadjusted wage share alone as an 
indication of real wage levels.
19 
One approach, then, is to compute wage gaps using standard 
neoclassical assumptions and estimates of relevant Cobb-Douglas 
parameters, using capital stocks, imputed technical progress and 
some estimate of "high employment hours." On the other hand, 
Gordon (1986) has argued that there is a productivity dividend to 
19K1odt (1986) makes a forceful case along these lines. 
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increased employment, which has been widely documented in the US 
data, suggesting a potential upward bias in wage gaps computed 
under the above procedure. One solution to this problem is to 
estimate the unconstrained response of average productivity to an 
increase in labor input. From these estimates the high employment 
average (and under Cobb-Douglas assumptions, marginal) product can 
be recovered. This procedure will identify and incorporate a 
productivity dividend if it exists. 
We recomputed wage gaps in manufacturing employing both 
procedures, under the assumption that high employment labor supply 
is simply equal to its average value over the 1970s.
20 
Both sets 
of wage gaps are displayed in Table 8. Our results for West German 
manufacturing continue to indicate a substantial wage gap, and a 
striking absence of one in the US. We find no evidence of a 
productivity dividend in West Germany, despite considerable 
evidence of one in the US, belying Gordon's (1986) recent claim of 
no difference in the productivity behavior between the US and 
Europe. Our results thus corroborate those of Artus (1984), Bruno 
(1986), and Sachs (1986) for West Germany and represent evidence 
for a number of wage-related theories of unemployment. 
A decomposition of the change in the estimated wage gap 
since 1970 can shed some light on the sources of the persistent 
wage problem in West German manufacturing. In Table 9, it is clear 
that while consumption wage growth has slowed considerably, the 
relative price of manufactures continues to deterioriate, despite 
a respite of falling oil prices and dollar appreciation. In 
20For details see the Appendix. 
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Table ~ 
Manufacturing Wage Gaps in the US and West Germanyt 
1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985 
FR Germany 
I 0.0 6.0 18.5 25.0 
II 0.0 6.6 15.0 21. 5 
US 
I 0.0 4.6 4.9 5.6 
II 0.0 2.3 3.3 -2.9 
t I: Neoclassical wage gaps described in text. II: Wage 
unconstrained adjustment of average productivity 
employment. High employment labor supply is assumed 









Decomposition of Change in the Manufacturing 
Wage Gap ~ West Germany. 1970-1985 
1970-75 75-80 80-85 
Total Change: +9.6 +11.0 +0.6 
Due to: 
+tlw/p c +18.5 +17.8 +4.7 
c v 
+tlp /p +3.4 +4.6 +3.9 
-tl(v/1) f -12.3 -11.4 -8.0 
of which: 
M -19.0 -12.9 -18.7 
tl(K/L)f + 6.7 +1.5 +10.7 
Source: US Office of Technology and Productivity and OECD, 
authors' calculations. 
addition, growth of estimated productivity at high employment is 
still lagging, although the imputed rate of technical progress 
has actually recovered its earlier trend growth; as the table 
makes clear, the culprit has been the cumulative effects of an 
investment slowdown over the past decade. 21 Not reflected in 
Table 9 is yet another important "supply shock." The tax 
wedge--the component of total compensation represented by 
indirect taxes, social insurance contributions, and other 
employee compensation not counted as wages and salaries - -has 
increased from 51. 6% in 1975 to 78% in 1984. When all these 
factors are taken into consideration, the much-touted 
Reallohnpause (wage pause) of the early 1980s remains 
insufficient to allow significant new job creation in 
manufacturing. 
Services; Where are the Jobs? 
We have argued that a variety of mechanisms operating in 
Germany may have prevented a US style adjustment to the adverse 
shocks of the 1970s. Considerable support exists for this 
interpretation of the divergent job creation performance of US 
and West Germany service economies. Growth in the broadly defined 
services in the US is widely recognized, and often called the 
"economic miracle" of the past decade. In a comparison of US 
and West European employment growth, Wegner (1983) found while 
that the composition of European employment has shifted towards 
2lSee Burda (1987) and Bruno and Sachs (1985). Bruno (1986) 
presents convincing evidence on the response of investment to the 
high real wages of the 1970s. 
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services, the shift has proceeded at a much a much slower rate 
than in the US, in both absolute and relative terms. For evidence 
on Germany, consider Figure 6, which compares total private 
dependent status employment in manufacturing and private 
service-producing industries. It could be claimed that the 
sluggish performance of service employment merely reflects lower 
overall growth. This view is rejected in Table 10, which compares 
the percentage point change in the share of total dependent-status 
employment in broadly defined services in the two countries 
since 1960. It is noteworthy that until the middle of the last 
decade these shifts were roughly of the same magnitude in the 
two countries; in the last decade the process in Germany has been 
brought to a virtual standstill. To get an idea of the 
magnitudes involved, had Germany sustained the same compositional 
shifts as the US, holding other employment constant, tertiary 
sector employment would have exceeded current levels by another 
22 
950,000 jobs, or roughly 3.5% of the 1985 labor force! 
In Table 11 we compare average growth rates in per employee 
real compensation in the Federal Republic of Germany and the US. 
In real terms, compensation growth in West German tertiary sectors 
has clearly outpaced its American counterparts, and has until 
recently kept pace with the manufacturing sector. In the most 
salient example, the average employee in the finance and insurance 
22 In 1975, tertiary dependent status employment in the FRG was 
6,485 million or .251/.749 .33 times all other dependent 
employment. Increasing this share by 5 percentage points over the 
subsequent decade makes it. 301/ .699 - .42 times all other 
private dependent employment in 1984 (18,272 million) - 7,868 
million, compared to the actual 1984 figure of 6,904 million. 
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Change in Relative Share of Dependent Status 
Employment in Tertiary Sectors as ~ Fraction of Total, 
1960-1984 (percentage points) 
FR Germany US 
1960-65 0,3 0,5 
1965-70 0,9 1.7 
1970-75 2,5 2,5 
1975-80 1.0 2,1 
1980-84 0,8 2,9 
Table 11 
Average Real Compensation Growth, FRG ~ US (%) 
1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 
1.6 0,8 1.1 0,3 
1.3 0,1 -0,9 -0,9 
1.9 2,4 1.1 0,5 
2,4 0,5 0,2 2,1 
2,1 1.0 -0,5 0,9 
4,9 5,9 3,5 0,8 
4,8 5,5 2,9 1.0 
5.5 5.6 1.4 -0.6 
4.5 6.3 2.3 0.8 
3.2 5.3 2.6 0.3 
sector in Germany receives 1.21 times the average compensation in 
manufacturing; in the US the comparable figure is 0:84. This 
significant differential seems to be a direct outcome of HBV and 
DAG (Deutsche Angeste11te Gewerkschaft) nationwide collective 
bargaining, as discussed in the last section. In wholesale and 
retail trade, the average German receives compensation amounting 
to .79 of the manufacturing average; in the US, the figure is 
0.59. Only in private services are the ratios closer (0.68 in FR 
Germany, 0.65 in the US).23 
Recall that a key prediction of the model involved the 
evolution of the wage differential between the more unionized 
manufacturing and the uncovered service sector. In the model with 
an absorbing service sector, one would expect the differential to 
increase; in the nonadjusting economy, the adjustment takes place 
through higher unemployment. Figure 7, which plots the standard 
deviation of log average compensation in the manufacturing, 
trade, transport and communication, finance and private service 
sectors, suggests that the US experience is characterized by a 
marked increase in relative wage dispersion, confirming results 
of Bell and Freeman (1985) and Lawrence and Lawrence (1985). 
Until 1975, relative wages in West Germany also followed this 
pattern. In the past ten years, however, intersectora1 wage 
dispersion in West Germany has actually fallen. While conflicting 
results have been reported within the industrial sector 
23Interesting1y, in the finance and trade sectors, US employment 
growth has been very strong. Over the period 1980 - 84, dependent 
status employment in FIRE and trade sectors increased 9.8 and 7.3% 
respectively in the US; in FR Germany, employment in the financial 
sector grew by only 3.1%, and in trade actually declined by 6.8%. 
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Figure 2 
Wage Dispersion Across Manufacturing and ~ 
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tMeasured as the standard deviation each year of the log of total 
nominal per worker compensation. 
(Breithaupt and Soltwede1 1980 and Grund1ach 1986 find decreases 
in wage dispersion, where Blanchard et a1. 1985 and Bell and 
Freeman 1985 report slight increases), our results shows an 
unequivocal tightening of wage dispersion at the one-digit level. 
It is not implausible that increasing unionization of the service 
sectors has contributed to wage demands in these sectors linked to 
those in dominant metal and chemical workers unions, an outcome 
predicted by simple union models. Table 12 charts the variability 
of compensation in the wholesale and retail trade, finance, and 
services sectors relative to aggregate manufacturing in the two 
countries over the past quarter decade. It depicts a significant 
decrease in variability in West Germany compared with the United 
States. Note that this decrease began in the mid-l970s, when the 
economy was growing rapidly. 
Trends in labor productivity in the tertiary industries 
provide additional support for our thesis. In a recent survey of 
the two countries, Wegner (1985) identified value-added per hour 
as the most salient feature distinguishing the performance of 
tertiary sectors in the US and West Germany. We reproduce his 
findings in Table 13. It seems unlikely that these striking 
productivity differences are solely attributable to different 
production techniques available in the two economies. Rather, the 
behavior of capital-labor ratios in these sectors support the 
contention that producers of services in the two countries are 
responding to differing relative prices. Figure 8 documents a 
secular pace of capital deepening in aggregate services in West 
Germany that is largely absent in the US; moreover, this trend is 
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Table 12. 
Variabiiity Qf Relative Wagest 
60-69 70-79 80-84 
FR Germany 
Trade 0.040 0.021 0.005 
Finance 0.031 0.025 0.003 
Services 0.033 0.022 0.009 
US 
Trade 0.010 0.053 0.014 
Finance 0.019 0.027 0.045 
Services 0.010 0.044 0.018 
tMeasured as the standard deviation of log annual compensation 
divided by annual compensation in manufacturing. Sources: US: 
Unpublished sectoral value-added data, Commerce Department and 
Economic Report of the President 1985. FR Germany: Statistisches 
Bundesamt, Fachserie 18, (Vo1kswirtschaft1iche Gesamtrechnung), 
Revidierte Ergebnisse, 1984. 
Table 11 
Labor Productivity Growth in the Service Sectors. 1960-83t 
1960-73 1973-83 
FR Germany 
Total Private Services 5.8 3.5 
Trade 4.4 3.0 
Tranport/Communication 4.5 2.2 
Finance 4.9 5.2 
Other Private Services 5.1 3.6 
Government 1.8 1.0 
US 
Total Private Services 1.7 0.5 
Trade 1.9 0.3 
Transport/Communication 4.1 1.9 
Finance 0.9 0.4 
Other Private Services 0.8 0.1 
Government 0.3 0.4 
tSource: Wegner (1985). Growth rates are annual rates of change in 
constant value added per worker-hour. 
_ Figure.8. 
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West Germany and the US, respectively. 
sharply different in manufacturing. If technology is the same 
across countries, this outcome is predicted directly by West 
Germany service industries facing a higher real price of labor. 
Table 14, which displays average growth in capital-labor ratios at 
the one-digit level service sectors, gives clear evidence of 
higher capital intensity in Germany, and more importantly, a break 
in the mid-1970s. 
To summarize, Germany has not experienced the strong growth 
of service employment observed in the US. This might seem 
puzzling, since output growth in these sectors has not been 
. . . f' 24 Cl 1 f h' 1ns1gn1 1cant. ear y, some 0 t 1S differential is due to 
slower growth rates of labor force participation in the Germany; 
nonetheless, until the mid-1970s the shift to a service economy 
was taking place at the same proportionate rate, while the 
past ten years have witnessed a departure from the trend shared 
with the US. Given the evidence on lower wage dispersion, markedly 
higher rates of labor productivity growth, and capital-labor 
ratios, we suspect that the "wage problem" has manifested itself 
in the German service sector. 
5. Conclusion 
High unemployment in West Germany has become an accepted and 
conspicuous feature of the world economic picture. The paths of 
240ver the period 1980-1984, real output of transport and 
communication sector grew by 7.5%, (7.3% in transport and public 
utilities in the US); banking and insurance 8.7% (9.6% in US); and 
personal services 8.6% (15. 7 %in US). Less impressive were the 
trade sector with 4.7% growth (20.9% in US) and, of course, 
manufacturing with a paltry 0.9% real growth (11.4% in US). 
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Table li 
Average Growth in Sectoral Ca~ita1-Labor Ratios, 
1961-84 
1961-73 1974-80 1981-84 
FR. Germany 
Manufacturing 6.3 3.6 4.3 
Trade 5.3 3.3 4.1 
Tranport/Communication 4.3 4.6 3.6 
Finance 2.5 4.1 3.8 
Other Private Services 6.7 5.5 7.2 
US 
Manufacturing 1.6 3.8 3.9 
Trade 2.8 3.3 2.7 
Tranport/Communication 2.2 2.1 3.1 
Finance 2.0 0.2 2.3 
Other Private Services 2.4 -1.0 1.5 
Source: US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis and 
German Statistical Office. 
unemployment and inflation, however, suggest that aggregate demand 
factors can only go part of the way in explaining the secular rise 
of joblessness in this country. We conclude that underlying real 
factors have raised the NAIRU, or equilibrium rate. 
We were unable to find any evidence that the rise in the 
NAIRU in West Germany is due to an increase in "frictional" 
unemployment. Rather, in comparing the relative labor market 
performance of Germany and the US, we suggest that nonadjustment 
of wages to adverse shocks and to unemployment itself should bear 
the brunt of blame. Whereas the US economy has responded to the 
adverse supply shocks of the 1970s with the creation of 20 million 
jobs in services, job creation in the tertiary sec tors of Wes t 
Germany was grossly insufficient to offset the reduction of 
employment in manufacturing. We find the data highly consistent 
with the hypothesis that wage rigidity in services--due to 
unionization, minimum wage provisions, or overly generous 
unemployment benefits--has obstructed rapid labor intensive growth 
in these sectors and can help to explain the continuing rise in 
West German unemployment. 
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Appendix I 
Estimation of Capital/Labor Substitution Elastisticies 
in an Error Correction Hodel 
The firm we model selects labor input L to maximize 
one-period profits or solve 
max pV - wL 
subject to the the constant returns, CES production function 
-l~ p • 
V is value added, K is the (fixed) capital stock, Al and A2 
represent Hicks and Harrod neutral technical progress, 
respectively, and wand p are the wage rate and the price of 
output. Define the elasticity of substitution u _(l+p)-l. 
It is easy to rewrite the first order condition as: 
(AI) 
where sK is capital's share in value-added. If K is not fixed, the 
condition will continue to hold, but the level of output is 
indeterminate and must be fixed elsewhere.Note how (AI) does not 
involve either Al or A
2
. Taking logs, we obtain 
In s -Kt Ina + pln(V/K)t (A2) 
If firms were always on the production function, one could 
regard (A2) as a regression equation. Generally, firms will be off 
the production for a variety of reasons. Costs of adjusting labor 
input may retard the reaction of firms to changes in relative 
factor prices. If there are fixed costs to hiring and firing, 
firms may hoard labor over the cycle. Clearly if (A2) is estimated 
directly, ignoring these phenomena, a left-out variable bias will 
33 
arise. If the omitted adjustment term is negatively correlated 
with V/K and makes a negative contribution to capital share, it 
will tend to bias estimates of p upward, and thus of 0 downward. 
The model presents an ideal application of an error 
correction model, which effectively only imposes the estimated 
relationship at the lowest frequencies.
25 
If In(V/K) and In sK are 
cointegrated with co integrating vector [1 -Ina -p], then although 
the individual series are nonstationary, the linear combination 
In SKt - Ina - pln(V/K)t 
is stationary. One error correction model that incorporates this 
restriction is 
~ln SKt - ~l~ln SKt_l+ ~2~ln(V/K)t_l + 
~3[ln SKt_l- lna - pln(V/K)t_l] + E t ' 
where E is an i.i.d. random variable. This model may be estimated 
in the levels as 
In s -Kt 
(A3) 
and given estimates of the a's, the parameter of interest here, p 
A A A A 26 









The regression results of estimating (A3) are presented in Table 
AI. The estimated value of p is -(-0.7581+0.7878)/(1.3971-.4892) 
- -.0327); implying a value of 0 of 1.034. The US results imply p-
0.1775 and 0-0.849. The estimates appear in Table AI. 
25 
A good references is Engle and Granger (1987). 
26 
Recent work of Stock (1986) has shown that 
cointegrating vectors to converge at high rates 
values, but are subject to small sample bias. 
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estimates of 
to their true 
Table Al 
OLS Estimates of Equation lall 













S.E. of regression - 0.037494 
Q(15) - 4.44. 
21 Observations (1963-1983) 







R:2 _ 0.459 
S.E. of regression - 0.0701 
Q(15) - 12.73 






































~ Appendix II 
Computation of Wage Gaps 
The wage gap is defined as the difference between actual 
wage and that which clears the market when L-Lf (at high 
employment). By the national income identity, technical progress 
may be estimated using Solow's method (see Bruno and Sachs 1985). 
That is, we approximate the continuous time full employment 




The resulting series was then projected on a constant and a fourth 
order polynomial in time. The fi tted series were used as the 
imputed technical progress. They are presented in Table A2. If 
production is given by V_Ka(AL)l-a_Al-aKaL I-a, then the average 
product of labor at high employment V/L
f 
is given by 
Al-a(l_a) (K/Lf)a. To compute this we used employment, gross 
constant-price capital stocks, and the imputed technical progress 
f series. The high employment labor supply L was taken to be average 
of annual manufacturing man-hours in the 1970s. Given that US 
manufacturing employment is roughly at its 1970s average this may 
be the appropriate benchmark. 
Alternatively, we estimated the following equation using 
36 
manufacturing data, using both OLS and instrumental variables: 
a l + a 2
l 1+ a 3k + a4v + ast +a6 t + a 7t t- - t t 73 80 
where lower case letters indicate logarithms. Next, one can solve 
this equation for steady state output: 
Now subtract It from both sides: 
a
4
v + ast +a6 t + a 7
t )] 
t 73 80 
Substituting If for 1, we have the average product at full 
employment: 






will be greater 
than unity. Note that we do not impose the constant 









Levels and Growth rates of 
Imputed Harrod Technical Progress 
Germany US 
logA %~ A logA %~ A 
1965 0.162304 4.826861 b .197749 3.288920 
1966 0.212715 5.041130 0.226876 2.912751 
1967 0.263900 5.118529 0.252814 2.593790 
1968 0.314685 5.078429 0.276096 2.328190 
1969 0.364087 4.940200 0.297217 2.112040 
1970 0.411319 4.723221 0.316631 1.941469 
1971 0.455788 4.446879 0.334757 1.812571 
1972 0.497093 4.130521 0.351972 1. 721489 
1973 0.535028 3.793550 0.368615 1. 664299 
1974 0.569582 3.455341 0.384986 1.637152 
1975 0.600934 3.135228 0.401347 1. 636118 
1976 0.629461 2.852643 0.417921 1. 657340 
1977 0.655730 2.626926 0.434890 1.696941 
1978 0.680504 2.477461 0.452400 1.750991 
1979 0.704741 2.423644 0.470557 1. 815650 
1980 0.729589 2.484798 0.489427 1.886991 
1981 0.756392 2.680337 0.509038 1. 961160 
1982 0.786689 3.029645 0.529381 2.034241 
1983 0.822209 3.552079 0.550404 2.102381 
1984 0.864879 4.267001 0.572021 2.161646 
1985 0.916818 5.193818 0.594103 2.208191 
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